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F. TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDERS ................... 1412
HE major developments in the field of civil procedure during the
Survey period occurred through judicial decisions and statutory
enactments.
I. SUBJECT MATITER JURISDICTION
The Texas Supreme Court addressed the jurisdiction of the district and
county courts in a number of decisions during the Survey period. Smith v.
Clary Corp.' held that the aggregating statute, 2 which allows multiple
plaintiffs to aggregate their claims for purposes of the minimum jurisdic-
tional amount in district court, 3 did not apply to defeat jurisdiction over
counterclaims brought by multiple defendants in a county court at law.4
Although each individual defendant's counterclaim must not exceed the
maximum jurisdictional limits of the county court, the aggregation statute
will not apply to divest the court of jurisdiction over the counterclaims of
multiple defendants.5
The supreme court limited the jurisdiction of the district courts in two
cases of interest to Texas attorneys. In State Bar of Texas v. Gomez,6 the
court held that the district court lacked jurisdiction over a suit com-
plaining of the State Bar of Texas' failure to institute a program to com-
pel its members to provide free legal services. 7 The unique jurisdictional
aspect of the case, said the court, arose out of its own "power to regulate
the practice of law in the State of Texas." 8 Thus, plaintiffs' claim seeking
to require the State Bar to implement a mandatory pro bono program
was not justiciable because that entity's authority was limited to propos-
ing regulations to the supreme court, and it could not implement the re-
quested remedy on its own.9 Moreover, to the extent the district court
would be required to direct the supreme court to take action, any relief
would "impinge on the Court's exclusive authority to regulate the prac-
tice of law."'10
This latter point also underlaid the decision in Board of Disciplinary
Appeals v. McFall." The district court in that case enjoined the discipli-
nary suspension of an attorney.' 2 The supreme court granted a writ of
mandamus to vacate the injunction and a writ of prohibition against fur-
l. 38 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1026 (July 7, 1995).
2. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 24.009 (Vernon 1988).
3. Id.
4. Smith, 38 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 1027.
5. Id. at 1026-27.
6. 891 S.W.2d 243 (Tex. 1994).
7. Id. at 244.
8. Id. at 245.
9. Id. at 246.
10. Id.
11. 888 S.W.2d 471 (Tex. 1994).
12. Id. at 472.
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ther proceedings in the district court, holding that the district court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction. 13 The court noted that it had estab-
lished "a comprehensive system of lawyer discipline" that included a right
of appeal directly to the supreme court but did not provide for interim
equitable relief in the district court. 14
Finally, the supreme court held in A&T Consultants v. Sharp15 that
only it, and not the district court, has jurisdiction over mandamus actions
against the executive officers of the State of Texas identified in the consti-
tution.16 In applying this rule to a mandamus action against one of those
officials under the Texas Open Records Act,' 7 the court relied on the
plain language of section 22.002(c) of the Government Code.' 8 The dis-
sent argued, however, that the majority misread the Texas Open Records
Act and established a "deplorable policy" by "taking upon itself the sole
responsibility for reviewing every open records dispute involving six large
state offices."1 9
II. SERVICE OF PROCESS
The Texas Supreme Court rejected an unduly formalistic approach to
the requirement of service of process on a minor in American General
Fire & Casualty Co. v. Vandewater.20 The court of appeals had held that a
minor could not waive service of process by voluntarily appearing in a
suit through a guardian or next friend.2' The supreme court disagreed,
stating that the focus should be on "whether the minor's interests have
been properly protected and whether a deficiency in notice or due pro-
cess has been shown."'22 Because there were no such deficiencies in the
case before it, and the minor's interests were protected by a guardian ad
litem, the court held that the minor was properly made a party to the
action. 23
The supreme court emphasized the importance of ensuring the accu-
racy of a return of service in Primate Construction, Inc. v. Silver.24 How-
13. Id. at 472-73.
14. Id. at 472.
15. 904 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. 1995).
16. Id. at 672. Compare Witt v. Whitehead, 900 S.W.2d 374, 375 (Tex. App.-Austin
1995, writ denied) ("Although the supreme court has exclusive jurisdiction over suits for
writ of mandamus, a district court has jurisdiction to issue [a mandatory] injunction against
a state executive officer.") (citations omitted).
17. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. §§ 552.001-.353 (Vernon 1994 & Supp. 1996).
18. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 22.002(c) (Vernon 1988); Sharp, 904 S.W.2d at 672.
19. Id. at 682 (Hecht, J., dissenting) (emphasis original).
20. 907 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1995).
21. Vandewater v. American Gen. Fire & Casualty Co., 890 S.W.2d 811, 814 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1994) (discussed in A. Erin Dwyer & Donald Colleluori, Annual Survey of
Texas Law; Texas Civil Procedure, 48 SMU L. REv. 1615, 1618 (1995) [hereinafter 1995
Annual Survey]), rev'd, 907 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1995).
22. Vandewater, 907 S.W.2d at 492.
23. Id. at 493.




ever, Herbert v. Greater Gulf Coast Enterprises, Inc. 25 teaches that this
authority should not be read so broadly as to mean that any inaccuracy in
a return of service is fatal. In Herbert, the defendant was served with
process in Connecticut under Rule 108.26 The return of service stated,
however, that a copy of the "Complaint," rather than the original peti-
tion, was delivered with the citation.27 The court held that, notwithstand-
ing the requirement of strict compliance with the rules regarding service
of process, the erroneous reference to the petition as a complaint did not
require setting aside the default judgment.28
III. SPECIAL APPEARANCE
Invoking the exception it articulated in Canadian Helicopters Ltd. v.
Wittig,29 the supreme court allowed the defendant in National Industrial
Sand Ass'n v. Gibson30 to obtain immediate appellate review by manda-
mus of the district court's denial of its special appearance under Rule
120a.31 Under Canadian Helicopters, an appeal from the denial of a spe-
cial appearance is normally deemed an adequate remedy unless the trial
court's assertion of personal jurisdiction is so clearly erroneous that the
harm to the defendant becomes irreparable. 32 The court held that the
facts in Gibson met this standard because the "trial court was not faced
with a voluminous record filled with contradictory evidence, but only
with the plaintiffs' bare allegations of conspiracy lacking any evidence of
conspiratorial acts in or directed to Texas."'33 In light of the "total and
inarguable absence of jurisdiction," mandamus relief was justified. 34
Practitioners concerned about a rigid application of the oft-stated
maxim that a waiver will result from the failure to strictly comply with
Rule 120a can take comfort from the decisions in Hotel Partners v.
Craig35 and Potkovick v. Regional Ventures, Inc.36 In Craig, the plaintiffs
alleged the defendants waived their special appearance by filing a motion
for protective order that did not expressly state that it was "subject to"
the special appearance. Noting that Rule 120a expressly allows a party to
25. No. 01-94-01240-CV, 1995 WL 678797 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 16,
1995, n.w.h.).
26. Herbert, 1995 WL 678797 at *1.
27. Id. at *3.
28. Id. at *3-*4.
29. 876 S.W.2d 304 (Tex. 1994).
30. 897 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. 1995).
31. Gibson, 897 S.W.2d at 771.
32. Canadian Helicopters, 876 S.W.2d at 308. See 1995 Annual Survey, supra note 21
at 1618-19.
33. Gibson, 897 S.W.2d at 776.
34. Id. (quoting Canadian Helicopters, 876 S.W.2d at 309). The dissent disagreed with
this conclusion, noting that the majority wholly failed to explain why the defendant's ap-
pellate remedies were inadequate. Gibson, 897 S.W.2d at 777 (Cornyn, J., dissenting).
35. No. 05-92-01625-CV, 1994 WL 719707 (Tex. App.-Dallas, Dec. 30, 1994, n.w.h.).
36. 904 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1995, no writ).
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participate in discovery without waiving its special appearance 37 and that
most of the defendants' filings contained the "subject to" language, the
court held that there was no requirement that discovery-related docu-
ments contain "magic words" stating that they are "subject to" a special
appearance. 38 Similarly, the Potkovick court held that Rule 120a's re-
quirement that affidavits be served at least seven days before the hearing
on a special appearance 39 is subject to the trial court's discretion to allow
the late filing of such affidavits.40
IV. VENUE
In response to recent outcries about burgeoning litigation and escalat-
ing damage awards, as well as increasing perceptions that many plaintiffs'
suits are simply frivolous, the 74th Legislature enacted a series of com-
prehensive acts during the Survey period designed to accomplish sweep-
ing "tort reform." Among these was Senate Bill 32, which effected
significant revisions to the Texas venue statute. 41 This amendment re-
pealed four former provisions of the venue statute,42 added eleven new
provisions,43 and revised five others.44 Twelve provisions remained un-
changed.45 With but one exception, 46 the amended statute became effec-
tive September 1, 1995.47 Although a detailed discussion of the amended
venue statute is beyond the scope of this article, some of the revisions are
particularly noteworthy.
A. GENERAL RULE AND DEFINITIONS
Under the former statute, venue was always proper "in the county in
which all or a part of the cause of action accrued or in the county of
37. TEX. R. Civ. P. 120a ("[t]he taking of depositions, the serving of requests for
admissions, and the use of discovery processes, shall not constitute a waiver of such special
appearance.").
38. Craig, 1994 WL 719707 at *6.
39. TEX. R. Civ. P. 120a.
40. Potkovick, 904 S.W.2d at 850.
41. Act of May 18, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 138, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 978
(Vernon) (codified at TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 15.001-.66 (Vernon Supp. 1996)).
42. Id. § 10, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. at 981 (repealing TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. §§ 15.036 (Corporations and Associations), 15.037 (Foreign Corporations),
15.040 (Nonresidents; Residence Unknown), 15.061 (Joinder of Defendants or Claims)
(Vernon 1986)).
43. See TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 15.001, 15.003-.007, 15.0115, 15.018,
15.0641, 15.064, 15066 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
44. Compare former TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.001 (Vernon 1986)
with TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.002 (Vernon Supp. 1996); see TEX. Civ.
PR~c. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 15.011, 15.032-.033, 15.062 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
45. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 15.012-.017, 15.031, 15.035, 15.038-
.039, 15.063-.064 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
46. Section 11(b) of the amending act provides that venue under TEX. CIv. PRAC. &
REM. CODE § 15.018, dealing with FELA and Jones Act claims, applies only to a suit com-
menced on or after January 1, 1996. Act of May 18,1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 138, § 11(b),
1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. at 982 (Vernon).
47. Id. § 11(a), 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. at 981.
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defendant's residence if the defendant was a natural person."8 Perhaps
to eliminate continuing debate about where a cause of action accrued, the
amended statute provides that venue is proper "in the county in which all
or a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim
occurred. '49 The general rule was also amended to add two new places
where venue is appropriate: (1) "the county of defendant's principal of-
fice in [Texas], if the defendant is not a natural person; o50 and (2) if none
of the other general rules apply, the county in which the plaintiff resided
at the time the cause of action accrued.51 Because § 15.002 now includes
a general rule specifying venue for all suits brought against corporations
(i.e., defendants who are not natural persons), the former exceptions es-
tablishing permissive venue for suits against domestic and foreign corpo-
rations have been repealed.5 2 The new general rule, however, substitutes
"principal office in this state" for the various categories formerly appear-
ing in the permissive venue sections.5 3 This change will hopefully reduce
the controversies that previously engulfed the courts as they struggled
with the now-discarded term "agency or representative. '54
The general venue provision also adds a transfer rule modelled after
the federal statute governing changes of venue.55 Section 15.002(b) per-
mits the trial court to transfer the case to another county of proper venue
"[f]or the convenience of the parties and witnesses and in the interest of
justice."'5 6 In contrast to its federal counterpart, however, this transfer
provision is available only to defendants.5 7 In addition, transfer is appro-
priate only where the court finds that maintaining the suit in the original
venue would be unjust to the defendants because of economic or personal
hardship, transfer would not work an injustice to any other party, and the
balance of interests of all parties predominates in favor of the transfer.58
Although the court must weigh each of these factors in making its deci-
sion, the amended statute provides no "check" on that decision-making
process. Instead, the trial court's decision to grant or deny a transfer is
grounds for neither an appeal nor a mandamus, and it does not constitute
48. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.001 (Vernon 1986).
49. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.002(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1996). The
amended statute still allows venue in the county of the defendant's residence if a natural
person. Id. § 15.002(a)(2).
50. Id. § 15.002(a)(3).
51. Id. § 15.002(a)(4).
52. Act of May 18, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 138, § 10, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. at 981
(Vernon) (repealing TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 15.036, 15.037 (Vernon
1986)).
53. Compare TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.002(a)(3) (Vernon Supp.
1996) with TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 15.036-.037 (Vernon 1986) (repealed
1995).
54. See, e.g., Ruiz v. Conoco, Inc., 868 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. 1993), discussed in Ernest E.
Figari, et al., Annual Survey of Texas Law: Texas Civil Procedure, 47 SMU L. REv. 1677,
1692-94 [hereinafter 1994 Annual Survey].
55. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1994).
56. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.002(b) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
57. Id.




Former section 15.061, enacted in 1983 essentially to codify the long-
standing Middlebrook doctrine, 60 provided that a court with venue of a
single claim against a defendant also had venue as to all properly joined
claims against that defendant as well as any other defendants who were
proper parties. The legislature repealed this provision, substituting in its
stead three new provisions in the general section of the statute governing
multiple parties and claims. The most important of these is sec-
tion 15.003, which deals with multiple or intervening plaintiffs. It requires
each plaintiff originally joining in the suit to establish proper venue, in-
dependent of any other plaintiff, unless it can show (again, independently
of the other plaintiffs) that: (1) joinder is proper; (2) the venue is not
unfair to any party; (3) "there is an essential need to have the claim tried
in the county in which the suit is pending;" and (4) the venue is fair and
convenient to the plaintiff and all defendants against whom the suit is
brought.61 Identical rules apply to any later joining or intervening plain-
tiffs. Section 15.003 also provides for an expedited interlocutory appeal
of the trial court's venue determination in the multiple or intervening
plaintiff context. Section 15.005 of the new statute, entitled "Multiple
Defendants," provides that, where a plaintiff has established proper
venue against a defendant, the court has venue as to all defendants of all
claims or actions arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series
of transactions or occurrences.62 Section 15.004, on the other hand,
makes clear that suits joining multiple claims arising out of the same
transaction or occurrence may be brought only in the county required by
a mandatory venue provision if any of the claims is governed by such a
provision.
Finally, subchapter A of the venue statute includes three other new
provisions that (1) set forth general definitions,63 (2) make clear that
venue is to be determined based on the facts existing at the time the
cause of action accrued,64 and (3) resolve any conflicts with the venue
provisions of the Texas Probate Code in suits by or against an executor,
administrator, or guardian for personal injury, death, or property
damage.65
B. MANDATORY AND PERMISSIVE VENUE
Under amended section 15.011 of the venue statute, suits for damages
to real property are once again subject to mandatory venue in the county
59. Id. § 15.002(c).
60. See Middlebrook v. David Bradley Mfg. Co., 86 Tex. 706, 26 S.W. 935, 935 (1894).
61. TEx. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.003(a) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
62. Id. § 15.005.
63. Id. § 15.001.
64. Id. § 15.006.
65. Id. § 15.007 (Vernon Supp. 1996) (providing that the provisions of the general




in which all or a part of the property is located. 66 The legislature also
included a new provision mandating venue of lease disputes in the county
in which the leased property is situated, either in whole or part.67 Section
15.018, which is new, requires all suits under the Federal Employers' Lia-
bility Act68 or the Jones Act 69 to be brought in the county where either
all or a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim
occurred, the defendant's principal office is located, or the plaintiff re-
sided when the cause of action accrued.70
In addition to the aforementioned deletion of the permissive venue ex-
ceptions for suits against domestic and foreign corporations, the amended
statute deleted the venue provision for suits against nonresidents or per-
sons whose residence was unknown.71 Minor wording revisions were also
made to the venue provisions for suits against insurance companies72 and
for breach of warranty by manufacturers. 73
C. GENERAL PROVISION
Three new provisions were added to Subchapter D of the venue stat-
ute. The most significant of these is section 15.0641, which provides that
one defendant's acts or omissions in relation to venue, including waiver,
cannot impair or diminish the right of any other defendant to challenge
venue.74 The amended statute also now includes a section providing for
an expedited mandamus remedy in cases involving a mandatory venue
provision75 and a provision making clear that the statute controls over
any conflicting rule of civil procedure. 76
V. PARTIES
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 42 provides that one or more members
of a class may sue on behalf of the entire class if, among other things, the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of
the class. The case of Forsyth v. Lake LBJ Investment Corp.7 7 is informa-
66. Id. § 15.011. The 1983 amendments to the venue statute had deleted suits for dam-
ages to land or to prevent waste as a basis for invoking the mandatory exception concern-
ing land actions. Compare TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.011 (Vernon 1986)
with TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1995 (Vernon 1964 & Supp. 1982-83) (repealed 1983).
67. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.0115 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
68. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1988).
69. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1988).
70. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.018 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
71. Act of May 18, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 138, § 10, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 979,
981 (Vernon) (repealing TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.040 (Vernon 1986)).
72. Id. § 3, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. at 980 (substituting "company's principal office in
this state" and "resided at the time the cause of action accrued" for "home office of the
company" and "resides," respectively, in TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.032(Vernon Supp. 1996)).
73. Id. Compare TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.033 (Vernon Supp. 1996)
with TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.033 (Vernon 1986).
74. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.0641 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
75. Id. § 15.0642.
76. Id. § 15.066.
77. 903 S.W.2d 146 (Tex. App.-Austin 1995, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
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tive in its interpretation of this requirement. The suit involved questions
about the enforceability of restrictive covenants imposed on property lo-
cated in the Horseshoe Bay subdivision. Lot owners in the subdivision
intervened on both sides of the case. Among those actually participating
in the action, those in favor of the restrictions outnumbered those op-
posed. Nevertheless, a group of intervenors seeking to declare the re-
strictions invalid requested the trial court to certify them as
representatives of a class encompassing all lot owners in the subdivision.
The trial court denied certification without elaborating the reasons for its
decision.78
In its opinion upholding the denial of class certification, the court of
appeals focused on the perceived inadequacy of the class representatives
to fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class members.79 In-
deed, the court concluded that the intervenors failed to satisfy either
prong of the test for adequacy of representation: (1) an absence of antag-
onism between the class members and representatives and (2) an assur-
ance that the representatives will vigorously prosecute the class members'
claims and defenses. 80 Addressing the first component, the court ob-
served that "class certification may be denied for lack of adequate repre-
sentation if there is [even] a possibility of significant disagreement within
the proposed class."'81 The opinion also noted that courts are more in-
clined to deny certification where there is "hard evidence of real disa-
greement" within the class. 82 Although the court acknowledged that the
opposition of twelve class members did not alone establish that a majority
of the class members opposed the position of the putative class represent-
atives, it held that actual intra-class antagonism had been established be-
cause, of the class members actively participating in the action, those
supporting the restrictions outnumbered those in opposition.8 3
The court next considered whether the representatives would avidly
pursue the claims and defenses of the class members. According to the
court, the failure of all but one of the proposed representatives to attend
the class certification hearing in person cast doubt upon the enthusiasm
with which they would act on behalf of the class. 84 Citing federal authori-
ties it termed as instructive,8 5 the court held that the movants' near com-
78. See TEX. R. Cirv. P. 42(a) (the trial court need not file findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law).
79. 903 S.W.2d at 150-52 (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 42(a)(4)).
80. Forsyth, 903 S.W.2d at 150-52 (citing Wiggins v. Enserch Exploration, Inc.,
743 S.W.2d 332, 335 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ dism'd w.o.j. for the test).
81. Forsyth, 903 S.W.2d at 151.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id at 152.
85. See Weisman v. Darneille, 78 F.R.D. 669, 671 (S.D. N.Y. 1978) ("Plaintiffs' evident
willingness to rely on counsel's ability to protect the interests of the class is inconsistent
with the participation required of an adequate class representative."); Goldchip Funding
Co. v. 20th Century Corp., 61 F.R.D. 592, 594 (M.D. Pa. 1974) ("The class is entitled to




plete reliance on their attorney at the evidentiary hearing weighed
against certification. 86
Ventura v. Banales87 addressed the interplay between the rules gov-
erning class actions and nonsuits. In Texas, the plaintiff has an absolute
right to take a nonsuit under Rule 16288 at any time before he has intro-
duced all of his evidence. 89 Rule 42 specifies an exception to this general
rule, however, by proscribing dismissals or settlements of class actions
without the approval of the court and notice of the proposed dismissal or
compromise being given to all members of the class in the manner the
court directs.90 In a case of first impression, the Ventura court decided
that this latter rule does not override the general principle set out in Rule
162 until a class has actually been certified. 91 The court therefore held
that the plaintiffs had an absolute right to nonsuit their pre-certification
class action.92 The court contrasted Texas procedure with Federal Rule
23, which does apply during the interim between filing of the complaint
and certification of the class.93 Although the Texas and Federal rules re-
garding class action are virtually identical, 94 the federal rule governing
voluntary dismissals is very different from its Texas counterpart. 95 Ac-
cordingly, because Rule 162 generally allows plaintiffs much greater lati-
tude than Federal Rule 41 to nonsuit their claims without court approval,
the Ventura court did not feel compelled to follow federal authority by
creating additional requirements to Rule 42.96
VI. PLEADINGS
In two cases decided during the survey period, the courts reached simi-
lar conclusions about the interplay between Rules 597 and 99(b) despite
differences in reasoning.98 The plaintiff in Thomas v. Gelber Group99
sued for breach of a gas purchase contract. Ten days after the defend-
ant's answer was due, plaintiff filed a motion for default judgment. Four
86. Forsyth, 903 S.W.2d at 152.
87. 905 S.W.2d 423 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1995, no writ).
88. TEX. R. Civ. P. 162.
89. Ventura, 905 S.W.2d at 424 (citing Hooks v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 808 S.W.2d
56, 59 (Tex. 1991)).
90. TEX. R. Civ. P. 42(e).
91. Ventura, 905 S.W.2d at 426.
92. Id.
93. Ventura, 905 S.W.2d at 425; see also Diaz v. Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands,
876 F.2d 1401, 1408 (9th Cir. 1989); Newberg on Class Actions § 8.19 (3rd Ed. 1992).
94. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) with TEX. R. Civ. P. 42(e).
95. See FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a) (court approval required before plaintiff may dismiss suit
unless notice of dismissal filed before adverse party serves answer or motion for summaryjudgment or all parties sign a stipulation of dismissal).
96. Ventura, 905 S.W.2d at 426.
97. TEX. R. Civ. P. 5 provides that a document is deemed timely filed if it is properly
addressed and stamped, mailed by first class mail on or before the "last day for filing
same," and received by the clerk not more than ten days late.
98. TEX. R. Civ. P. 99(b) (defendant's answer due by 10:00 a.m. on the first Monday
after the expiration of 20 days from the date of service).
99. 905 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no writ).
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days later, defendant sent his answer by first class mail. Although this
answer was received in the clerk's office within ten days after it was
mailed, the court had already entered the requested default between the
dates of the defendant's mailing and the clerk's receipt of the answer.
The court of appeals reversed the default judgment, observing that "[a]
default judgment may not be granted when the defendant has an answer
on file, even if the answer was filed late."'100 The issue articulated by the
court was whether the "last day for filing" an answer, for purposes of
Rule 5, is the date calculated under Rule 99(b) or the later date when the
default judgment is actually entered. 1 1 Choosing the latter, the court
refused to treat a mailed answer differently than one filed with the clerk
because once the provisions of Rule 5 are met, the post office becomes a
branch of the clerk's office for purposes of filing pleadings. 10 2 Therefore,
the defendant's answer was "filed" by mail pursuant to Rule 5 before the
trial court had signed the default judgment. 10 3 In $429.30 in U.S. Cur-
rency v. State,'°4 on the other hand, the court held that an answer "filed"
one day after the due date was untimely even though it was mailed 13
days before, and received the same day as, the default judgment was ren-
dered. 10 5 Despite being "untimely," however, the court reversed the de-
fault judgment because the answer had been filed before the default
judgment was filed and because the defendant had not had notice of the
default judgment hearing.1' 6
Lofton v. Allstate Insurance Co.10 7 involved appellate Rule 4(b), 08 the
mailbox rule for filings in Texas appellate courts. The sole issue in the
case was "whether, in the absence of a postmark or a certificate of mail-
ing, an attorney's uncontroverted affidavit may establish a date of mailing
for compliance with" the rule.10 9 In a per curiam opinion, the Texas
Supreme Court held that it could." 0 Although the case does not mention
Rule 5, its holding undoubtedly extends to this companion rule of civil
procedure."'
Trial courts have broad discretion under Rule 41112 with respect to sev-
ering improperly joined parties and claims.113 A severance is proper "to
100. Id. at 788; see also TEX. R. Civ. P. 239; Davis v. Jefferies, 764 S.W.2d 559, 560 (Tex.
1989).
101. Thomas, 905 S.W.2d at 789.
102. Id. (citing Milam v, Miller, 891 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1994, writ ref'd.),
discussed in 1995 Annual Survey, supra note 21 at 1626-27).
103. Thomas, 905 S.W.2d at 789.
104. 896 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ).
105. Id at 365.
106. Id. at 365-66.
107. 895 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam).
108. TEX. R. App. P. 4(b).
109. Lofton, 895 S.W.2d at 693.
110. Id. at 693-94.
111. Compare TEX. R. App. P. 4(b) with TEX. R. Civ. P. 5.
112. TEX. R. Civ. P. 41.




do justice, avoid prejudice and further convenience.' 14 With these de-
sired ends in mind, several courts of appeals have held in cases against
insurers alleging both a breach of contract and a breach of the duty of
good faith and fair dealing that trial courts are required to sever the
claims when there is evidence of settlement offers which would be admis-
sible in one action but highly prejudicial on the other."15 Some of these
courts reasoned that an insurer's interests could not adequately be pro-
tected by a limiting instruction to the jury not to interpret evidence of the
settlement offer as an admission of liability in the contract action."l 6
Bucking this trend, the court in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Evins"17 held
that a severance is not always required in these circumstances. The court
observed that even an improper mention of a settlement offer is usually
curable by a trial court's instruction to disregard."18 Therefore, it refused
to assume that the jury would ignore a similar instruction limiting their
consideration of the settlement offer to the bad faith claim.1 19
VII. DISCOVERY
A. SCOPE AND PROCEDURES
After several missed opportunities to address the issue,120 the Texas
Supreme Court considered the propriety of "apex" depositions (i.e., dep-
ositions of corporate officers at the apex of the corporate hierarchy) in
Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v. Garcia.12' The court held that, upon
the filing of a motion for protective order supported by an affidavit attest-
ing to a corporate official's lack of personal knowledge of the subject
matter of the suit, the trial court should determine whether the party re-
questing the deposition has shown that the official has any unique or su-
perior knowledge of discoverable information.' 22 If she does not, then
the party requesting the deposition should be required to first seek the
discovery through less intrusive means, such as depositions of lower-level
employees, interrogatories, or document requests. 123 If, after a good
faith effort to obtain the discovery through less intrusive means, the re-
questing party shows (1) the official's deposition is likely to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence, and (2) alternative means of discovery
have been unsuccessful, the trial court should modify or vacate the pro-
114. Id.
115. See, e.g., United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Millard, 847 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton fst Dist.] 1993, orig. proceeding); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Wilborn, 835
S.W.2d 260 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, orig. proceeding).
116. See, e.g., Wilborn, 835 S.W.2d at 262.
117. 894 S.W.2d 847 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1995, no writ).
118. Id. at 850 (citing Beutel v. Paul, 741 S.W.2d 510, 513 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1987, no writ)).
119. 894 S.W.2d at 850.
120. See 1995 Annual Survey, supra note 21 at 1627.
121. 904 S.W.2d 125 (Tex. 1995).
122. Id. at 128 (holding based on language in Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Superior Court
of San Mateo County, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 363,367 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992)).




The supreme court also expressed concern about overly broad discov-
ery directed to corporations in Dillard Department Stores, Inc. v. Hall,1 25
which the court described as "a simple false arrest case. ' 126 The court
held that a request that the defendant produce incident reports and claim
files relating to other false arrest claims at all of its stores nationwide for
a five-year period was overly broad as a matter of law.127 In response to
the plaintiff's argument that he needed these materials to determine
whether he could allege in good faith a policy of racial discrimination on
the part of the defendant, the court stated that "[tihis is the very kind of
'fishing expedition' that is not allowable under rule 167 of the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure.' 28
The supreme court decried the trial court's management of a mass
products liability suit in Able Supply Co. v. Moye.' 29 The 300 defendants
in that case sent a master set of interrogatories to the 3,000 plaintiffs,
asking for, among other things, the identity of any physicians who had
attributed any plaintiff's alleged injury to a specific product manufactured
or supplied by any defendant. 130 Pursuant to the trial court's case man-
agement order, only 800 plaintiffs had answered this interrogatory in the
eight years after it was propounded, and virtually all of them merely
stated that they had not yet determined the answer and would supple-
ment their response at a later date.' 3' Under these facts, the court held it
was a clear abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny defendants'
motion to compel an answer to this interrogatory. 132
In what was apparently a case of first impression, the Texarkana court
of appeals held in Simmons v. Thompson13 3 that a party does not have an
"absolute right" to have her attorney present at a physical examination
ordered pursuant to Rule 167a.134 The court concluded that whether the
attorney should be allowed to attend the examination was within the dis-
cretion of a trial court and should be determined on a "case-by-case ba-
sis" on a showing of a particular need for the attorney's presence. 135 The
dissent, emphasizing that the examination was to be conducted by the
opposing party's physician, argued that the attorney's presence might be
just as important as his presence at an oral deposition and should be al-
124. Id. Even at this stage, the trial court retains discretion to protect against abuse
through appropriate restrictions on "the duration, scope, and location of the deposition."
Id.
125. 909 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 491-492.
128. Id. at 492 (citing Loftin v. Martin, 776 S.W.2d 145, 148 (Tex. 1989)).
129. 898 S.W.2d 766 (Tex. 1995).
130. Id at 767-68.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 771.
133. 900 S.W.2d 403 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1995, orig. proceeding).
134. TEX. R. Civ. P. 167a; Simmons, 900 S.W.2d at 404.
135. 900 S.W.2d at 404.
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lowed as a matter of right.136
Practitioners should also take note of three opinions of the Texas At-
torney General relating to deposition procedures. First, the Attorney
General has concluded that, notwithstanding the provisions of Rules
202(1)(e) 137 and 166c, 138 a trial court cannot order, and the parties cannot
stipulate to, the recording of an oral deposition solely by non-steno-
graphic means.1 39 The Attorney General relied on section 52.021(f) of
the Civil Practice and Remedies Code,'140 which provides that, with cer-
tain exceptions not relevant here, "all depositions conducted in this state
must be recorded by a certified shorthand reporter.' 141 To the extent the
procedural rules conflict with this statutory provision, they are invalid.142
The Attorney General also opined that the witness fees required under
section 22.001 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code 143 are applicable
to witnesses subpoenaed for depositions as well as court appearances.'"
B. PRIVILEGES AND EXEMPTIONS
The Texas Supreme Court addressed a number of privilege questions
during the Survey period. In a decision that may have a significant im-
pact on interstate controversies, the court held that the scope of the attor-
ney-client privilege will be governed by the law of the state with the most
significant relationship to the allegedly privileged communication.' 45 The
court noted that, although the attorney-client privilege is the only one of
the communications privileges recognized by all the states, the degree of
protection it affords may vary from state to state.' 46 The court concluded
that the most significant relationship test would foster the purpose behind
the attorney-client privilege - i.e., the free flow of information between
client and attorney.147
136. Id. (Grant, J., dissenting).
137. TEX. R. Civ. P. 202(1)(e) (court may order, on motion and notice, that deposition
be recorded solely by non-stenographic means).
138. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166c (parties may stipulate to taking of deposition before any
person and in any manner).
139. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. Nos. DM-339 (1995), DM-308 (1994).
140. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 52.021(f) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
141. Id.; Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. Nos. DM-339, DM-308.
142. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. Nos. DM-339, DM-308. The Attorney General also rejected
the argument that TEX. R. Civ. P. 202(1)(e) could be harmonized with the statutory re-
quirement of a certified shorthand reporter by construing the statute to require only that
the reporter make the non-stenographic recording. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. DM-339, n.3.
143. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 22.001 (Vernon Supp. 1996) (requiring
payment of $10 witness fee, which includes reimbursement for mileage).
144. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. DM-342 (1995).
145. Ford Motor Co. v. Leggat, 904 S.W.2d 643, 647 (Tex. 1995).
146. Id. at 647. Relevant to this case, Texas applies control group test for corporate
attorney-client privilege, while Michigan appears to follow subject-matter test. Id. at 646.
147. Id. at 647-48. The court also rejected a challenge to the sufficiency of an affidavit
submitted to support the privilege claim based on an allegedly defective jurat and the fact
that only a photocopy of the affidavit was submitted. Id at 645-46. Compare Humphreys
v. Caldwell, 888 S.W.2d 469, 470-71 (Tex. 1994) (affidavits submitted to support privilege
claims were fatally defective because they failed to unqualifiedly represent that the facts
stated therein were within the affiants' personal knowledge and were true).
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Constitutional privileges were at issue in Tilton v. Marshall148 and
Texas Department of Public Safety Officers Ass'n v. Denton."49 In Tilton,
the court held that a request for evangelist Robert Tilton's records of
entities or charities to which he tithed did not violate his First Amend-
ment right of free exercise of religion or freedom of association. 150 In
rejecting the freedom of association claim, the court distinguished Til-
ton's tithing records from the records of those who tithed to him. Tilton's
tithing records would not reveal the name of those associated with the
entities he tithed to; whereas the records of those who tithed to him, on
the other hand, would reveal privileged information under a previous
holding of the court.15'
Denton addressed the issue of a plaintiff's assertion of his Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination.' 52 The court held that the "of-
fensive use" doctrine described in Republic Insurance Co. v. Davis153
governed the plaintiff's Fifth Amendment privilege claim as well. 154
Although the offensive use test was met in the case before it, however,
the court held that the trial court exceeded its discretion in simply dis-
missing plaintiff's claims.155 Instead, the court directed the trial court to
consider other possible remedies, including delaying the proceedings or
imposing some lesser sanction. 156
Rule 166b(4) sets forth the now-familiar procedure to be followed by a
party who seeks to withhold information or documents from discovery on
privilege grounds. 157 The trial bar has struggled with the proper applica-
tion of this procedure in responding to document requests that a party
believes are both overbroad and seek potentially privileged materials. In
Texaco, Inc. v. Sanderson,'58 the supreme court provided some guidance
on this issue, holding that the Rule 166b(4) procedure is triggered only by
"an appropriate discovery request."'1 59 Thus, the court held that the trial
court erred in finding that the defendants had waived their privilege
claims by failing to assert them properly in response to plaintiffs' over-
broad document request.' 60 Significantly, the high court's decision ap-
pears to hinge on the determination that the request in question was, in
fact, overbroad. Because a party will often be unable to predict with cer-
tainty that a court will agree with its overbreadth objection, the careful
148. 38 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1140 (Aug. 1, 1995).
149. 897 S.W.2d 757 (Tex. 1995).
150. U.S. CONST. amend. I; Tilton, 38 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 1146.
151. Id. at 1146-47 (citing Tilton v. Moye, 869 S.W.2d 955, 956 (Tex. 1994)).
152. U.S. CONST. amend. V; Denton, 897 S.W.2d 757.
153. 856 S.W.2d 158, 163 (Tex. 1993).
154. Denton, 897 S.W.2d at 760-61.
155. Id. at 763-64.
156. Id. at 763.
157. TEx. R. Cv. P. 166b(4) (requiring party to plead particular exemption from dis-
covery, introduce evidence necessary to support it, and produce the requested discovery
for in camera inspection if necessary).
158. 898 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. 1995).




practitioner would still be well advised to secure the opposing party's
agreement if she wishes to proceed with a two-step procedure for the
presentation of objections.
The court in Dolcefino v. Ray161 cast doubt on whether the Texas
courts will read the United States Supreme Court decision in Branzburg
v. Hayes'62 as creating a qualified privilege for journalists. 163 The court
noted that the Texas Rules of Civil Evidence, adopted after Branzburg
was decided, do not include a journalist's privilege and indeed, state that
no person has a privilege except as provided by the constitution, statute,
or rule. 16 Nevertheless, the court did not decide the question because it
found that the trial court had properly ordered the journalist to answer
certain questions even if a qualified privilege were to be recognized. 165
Hardesty v. Douglas'66 involved an attempt to designate a physician as
a consulting expert, thereby immunizing him from discovery, after the
physician had already submitted an affidavit that was used to defeat sum-
mary judgment. Relying on the supreme court's decision in Tom L. Scott,
Inc. v. Mcllhany,167 the court held that the attempted designation of the
expert as consulting only was offensive to the intended purpose of the
discovery rules and ineffective. 168 For purposes of the designation issue,
the court reasoned that the submission of the expert's affidavit was the
equivalent of calling him to testify. 169
C. DUT' TO SUPPLEMENT
Continuing a recent trend, the Texas courts generally evinced a more
pragmatic and flexible approach during the Survey period to the rule re-
quiring the automatic exclusion of witnesses who are not properly identi-
fied in original or supplemental interrogatory answers. Thus, in Melendez
v. State,170 the court held that it was error to exclude plaintiff's expert
witness, who was not identified in a supplemental interrogatory answer,
but who was included in a written designation of experts, was deposed,
and provided a report to defendant.171 Similarly, the court in $23,900.00
v. State172 held that a police officer was properly identified as a witness
where the state provided the address and phone number for police head-
161. 902 S.W.2d 163 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, orig. proceeding) (per
curiam) petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3561 (U.S., Feb. 5, 1996) (No. 95-1250).
162. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
163. Dolcefino, 902 S.W.2d at 164.
164. Id. (citing TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 501).
165. Id. at 164-65.
166. 894 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. App.-Waco 1995, orig. proceeding).
167. 798 S.W.2d 556 (Tex. 1990).
168. Hardesty, 894 S.W.2d at 550-51 (citing Mcllhany, 798 S.W.2d at 560).
169. Id. at 551.
170. 902 S.W.2d 132 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ).
171. Id. at 136-37. But see Patton v. Saint Joseph's Hosp., 887 S.W.2d 233, 238-39 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 1994, writ denied) (refusing to treat experts' reports or depositions as
supplementation).
172. 899 S.W.2d 314 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no writ).
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quarters, even though the officer was not stationed there. 173 The court
also rejected the argument that the officer's testimony should have been
excluded because the interrogatory answers were not sworn. 174 In Heise
v. Presbyterian Hospital,175 however, the court held that a party may not
supplement its answers to interrogatories regarding witnesses simply by
adopting a co-party's answers to those interrogatories. 176
The supreme court has held that good cause may exist to allow the
testimony of an individual party-witness who has failed to identify himself
in answers to interrogatories when his personal knowledge of relevant
facts has been communicated to all parties at least tliirty days before
trial.177 Two noteworthy cases decided during the Survey period mea-
sured the parameters of this rule. In Morris v. Short,178 the court held
that the plaintiff established good cause to allow her to call the defendant
as a witness without having identified him in her interrogatory answers
because the witness's identity was certain and his knowledge of relevant
facts was communicated by the plaintiff in her pleadings and other inter-
rogatory answers. 179 In R.H. v. State, however, the court held that the
complaining witness in a juvenile proceeding was not the equivalent of a
party.180 Thus, the trial court erred in allowing the complaining witness's
testimony when he was not identified in the state's interrogatory
answers. 18'
The supreme court addressed the question of whether the erroneous
exclusion of an expert's testimony was harmless error in Williams Distrib-
uting Co. v. Franklin.l '2 The court of appeals had held that the error was
harmless because the defendant had identified as potential witnesses, but
did not attempt to call at trial, two other experts on the same subject.' 83
The supreme court rejected this analysis of the harmless error standard,
stating that it put the defendant to the unacceptable choice of having to
offer the testimony of another expert that it might consider weaker,
thereby abandoning its complaint regarding the exclusion, or to disparage
the weaker evidence on appeal to show reversible error.184 The supreme
court held the courts should not intrude in this way in the decision of a
173. Id. at 316-17; see also FDIC v. Mediplex of Houston, Ltd., 889 S.W.2d 464, 465-66
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ dism'd by agr.) (failure to provide expert wit-
ness's address and telephone number in interrogatory answer did not justify exclusion,
where information was contained in expert's report delivered contemporaneously with,
and referred to in, interrogatory answers).
174. $23,900.00, 899 S.W.2d at 317.
175. 888 S.W.2d 264 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1994, writ granted).
176. Id. at 267.
177. Smith v. Southwest Feed Yards, 835 S.W.2d 89, 91 (Tex. 1992).
178. 902 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1995, writ denied).
179. Id. at 570-71.
180. 905 S.W.2d 726 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1995, no writ).
181. Id. at 729.
182. 898 S.W.2d 816 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam).
183. Williams Distrib. Co. v. Franklin, 884 S.W.2d 503, 509-10 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1994), rev'd, 898 S.W.2d 816.
184. Franklin, 898 S.W.2d at 817.
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party and its counsel regarding what witnesses to call and why. 185
D. SANCTIONS
The supreme court overruled the trial court's imposition of discovery
sanctions in Global Services, Inc. v. Bianchi,186 which involved an allega-
tion that the defendants had not produced documents requested by the
plaintiff. As proof of the alleged failure, plaintiff submitted two exhibits
to the trial judge in camera. The supreme court held that the trial judge
erred in sanctioning defendants for failing to produce documents when
the only evidence offered in support of the allegation was submitted in
camera and not provided to defendants. 187
In Occidental Chemical Corp. v. Banales, 88 the trial court found that
defense counsel had intentionally failed to disclose the name of adverse
fact witnesses in discovery.' 89 The trial court imposed monetary sanc-
tions against the defendant's attorneys and also ordered that all of their
notes of interviews with the undisclosed witness be produced to the plain-
tiffs.190 The supreme court held that the attorney work product privilege
protects two different types of information: (1) the attorney's thought
processes and documents recording them; and (2) "the mechanical com-
pilation of information to the extent such compilation reveals the attor-
ney's thought processes."'191 With respect to the former category, the
court held that the privilege was absolute, subject only to the exceptions
referred to in Rule 166b(3)(a).' 92 The court rejected, however, the argu-
ment that the privilege protecting compiled information was absolute as
well.193 The court then concluded, apparently without deciding which
work product protection applied, that the trial court abused its discretion
in ordering the attorney's notes produced under the facts of the case
before it.194
Since the supreme court announced the new, stricter standard for re-
viewing "death penalty" sanctions (e.g., striking pleadings, default judg-
ments) in TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Powell,195 the
intermediate appellate courts have struggled with its application. For ex-
ample, TransAmerican requires that a trial court, before imposing death
penalty sanctions, "consider the availability of less stringent sanctions and
whether such lesser sanctions would fully promote compliance."' 196 In
185. Id.
186. 901 S.W.2d 934 (Tex. 1995).
187. Id. at 938.
188. 907 S.W.2d 488 (Tex. 1995).
189. Id. at 489.
190. Id.
191. lId at 490.
192. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(3)(a) (citing exceptions to privilege found in TEX. R. Civ.
EVID. 503(d)); Banales, 907 at 490.
193. Banales, 907 S.W.2d at 490.
194. Id.
195. 811 S.W.2d 913, 917-18 (Tex. 1991).
196. Id. at 917; see also Chrysler Corp. v. Blackmon, 841 S.W.2d 844, 849 (Tex. 1992).
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Andras v. Memorial Hospital System, 197 the court interpreted the
supreme court's standard as requiring the actual imposition of lesser
sanctions as a prerequisite to death penalty sanctions. 198 The court held,
however, that a prior order to compel coupled with a threat to dismiss for
non-compliance constituted such a lesser sanction.199 The court in Hamill
v. Level200 declined to follow this interpretation of the standard for death
penalty sanctions, concluding instead that lesser sanctions need only be
considered, not actually imposed.201 Thus, the court held that where the
offending party had previously agreed to pay his opponent's attorney's
fees in connection with a prior motion to compel, the trial court was
within its discretion in dismissing the case as a sanction, despite the fact
that the court itself had not imposed any prior sanctions. 20 2
Rule 166b(7) requires that all discovery motions contain a certification
by the movant that efforts to resolve the dispute without court interven-
tion have been attempted and failed.20 3 In United Services Auto Ass'n v.
Thomas,204 the court held that the trial judge abused his discretion in
sanctioning a party for discovery abuse where the motion for sanctions
did not contain such a certificate of conference.205
VIII. DISMISSAL
In regard to the subject of dismissals, the most significant case was the
supreme court's decision in Hyundai Motor Co. v. Alvarado.206 In this
case, the defendant obtained a partial summary judgment on certain of
plaintiff's causes of action. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a motion for
nonsuit under Rule 162. Thus, the issue before the court was whether the
partial summary judgment survived the nonsuit.
The supreme court recognized the general rule that a plaintiff has the
right to take a nonsuit at any time until he introduces all evidence other
than rebuttal evidence,207 and that a nonsuit "may have the effect of viti-
ating earlier interlocutory orders. '208 The high court, however, drew the
line with respect to summary judgment motions. The court reasoned that
if the only cutoff point for nonsuit was after plaintiff had introduced all of
his evidence, then the plaintiff "could in effect avoid any summary judg-
ment by merely requesting a nonsuit after the case was adjudicated by the
197. 888 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied).
198. Id. at 571 (citing Blackmon, 841 S.W.2d at 849-50).
199. Andras, 888 S.W.2d at 573.
200. 900 S.W.2d 457 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1995, no writ).
201. Id. at 461 & n.3.
202. Id. at 464-65. Although the trial court considered the agreement a lesser sanction,
the appellate court held that the agreement was an indication that the lesser sanction
would fail. Id.
203. Id.
204. 893 S.W.2d 628 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, writ denied).
205. Id. at 629-30.
206. 892 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam).
207. Alvarado, 892 S.W.2d at 854 (citing Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Special, 849




summary judgment."20 9 Accordingly, in order to give force to the partial
summary judgment rule provisions, the supreme court held that once a
trial court announces a decision on a summary judgment motion that ad-
judicates a claim, that claim is no longer subject to the plaintiffs right to
nonsuit.2 10 Accordingly, if the plaintiff takes a nonsuit under that scena-
rio, it has the effect of a dismissal with prejudice.
Rule 162 provides that any nonsuit or dismissal pursuant to that rule
"shall not prejudice the right of an adverse party to be heard on a pend-
ing claim for affirmative relief."121' This provision has led to the well-
established principle that a plaintiffs nonsuit will not result in a dismissal
of the entire case if the defendant has previously asserted a claim for
affirmative relief.2 12 In Quanto International Co. v. Lloyd,2 13 the court
held that a defendant's motion to refer all claims to arbitration was a
"claim for affirmative relief" within the meaning of foregoing
authorities.21 4
Rule 165a governs the procedure for dismissal for want of prosecution
and provides that a motion to reinstate a case dismissed for want of pros-
ecution "shall set forth the grounds therefor and be verified by the mo-
vant or his attorney. 2 15 Two decisions recognized qualifications to the
requirement that a motion to reinstate be verified. In Federal Lanes, Inc.
v. City of Houston,216 the court held that a joint motion to reinstate a suit
by both parties was equivalent to a stipulation as to the facts and there
was no need to support the motion with a sworn affidavit or verifica-
tion.2 17 In Neese v. Wray,218 the court held that a trial court may reinstate
a case dismissed for want of prosecution on its own motion within 30 days
after dismissal, even though plaintiff's motion to reinstate was
unverified. 219
A number of cases during the Survey period displayed a liberal trend
to require reinstatement of cases that have been dismissed for want of
prosecution.220 In each of these cases, the trial court had refused to rein-
state a case that had been dismissed for want of prosecution. Although
recognizing that the trial courts' decision in this context was subject to
considerable deference, each of the courts held that reinstatement was
erroneously denied. In Burns v. Drew Woods, Inc.,221 the court further
209. Id. at 855.
210. Id.
211. See supra notes 95-105 and accompanying text.
212. BHP Petroleum Co. v. Millard, 800 S.W.2d 838, 840 (Tex. 1990).
213. 897 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, orig. proceeding).
214. Id. at 487.
215. TEx. R. Civ. P. 165a(3).
216. 905 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ).
217. Id. at 689.
218. 893 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995 no writ)).
219. Id. at 170-71.
220. Clark v. Yarbrough, 900 S.W.2d 406, 410 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1995, writ de-
nied); Burns v. Drew Woods, Inc., 900 S.W.2d 128, 130 (Tex. App.-Waco 1995, no writ);
Seigle v. Hollech, 892 S.W.2d 201, 203-04 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ).
221. 900 S.W.2d 128.
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noted that if the movant presents uncontroverted evidence that his failure
to appear was based upon a reasonable explanation, then the trial court
must reinstate the case. 222
In FDIC v. Kendrick,22 3 the FDIC, as plaintiff, had announced to the
trial court that it had reached a tentative settlement with defendant, but
that such settlement was subject to approval by various committees of the
FDIC. Subsequently, the trial court notified the parties that it expected
the settlement to be consummated by a specified date. Before the speci-
fied date, the FDIC, with the permission of the defendant, requested a
continuance of the deadline for at least 30 days in order for the FDIC to
further consider the settlement offer. After the 30-day period expired,
the trial court dismissed the action. Under those circumstances, the ap-
peals court held that the trial court's dismissal of the action for want of
prosecution was not an abuse of discretion.224 In this regard, the court
observed that it was well established that neither settlement activity nor
the passive attitude of opposing parties excuses a want of diligent
prosecution.225
IX. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Murillo v. Valley Coca-Cola Bottling Co. 226 addressed the issue of
whether trial testimony from another suit can be used as summary judg-
ment evidence. Analogizing to cases involving the admissibility of court
records from other suits, 227 the Murillo court held that trial testimony
from other cases is also acceptable summary judgment proof.228 The
court stressed that the prior testimony must be certified or attested under
oath as authentic.229 The testimony also must set forth facts that would
be admissible at trial.230
Two other cases decided during the Survey period also involved issues
of summary judgment evidence. In Clendennen v. Williams, the court
held that an unsworn affidavit was not competent summary judgment
proof and should be stricken.231 In Wilson v. Burford, the Texas Supreme
Court held that a deposition transcript attached to a brief in support of a
motion for summary judgment, which was also referenced in the non-
222. Id. at 130.
223. 897 S.W.2d 476 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1995, no writ).
224. Id. at 482.
225. Id. at 481.
226. 895 S.W.2d 758 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1995, no writ).
227. Although the court cited one authority holding that pleadings from other lawsuits
are proper summary judgment evidence, see Kazmir v. Suburban Homes Realty, 824
S.W.2d 239, 244 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, writ denied), it concluded that Texas courts
had not yet directly answered the question whether testimony from other suits was admis-
sible. Murillo, 895 S.W.2d at 761.
228. 895 S.W.2d at 762.
229. Id.; see also TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(c) (authenticated or certified public records are
proper summary judgment evidence); TEx. R. Civ. P. 166a(f).
230. 895 S.W.2d at 762 (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(f) and Mitre v. Brooks Fashion
Stores, Inc., 840 S.W.2d 612, 618 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied)).
231. 896 S.W.2d 257, 259 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1995, no writ).
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movants' response, was proper summary judgment evidence. 232 The
court bypassed the question of whether the evidence became part of the
record by its attachment to movant's brief.233 Instead, the court held that
the deposition became evidence under Rule 166a(c) 234 by the references
to it in the non-movants' response. 235 The non-movants argued that Mc-
Connell v. Southside Independent School District236 required summary
judgment evidence to be set out in the motion. The supreme court dis-
agreed, observing that McConnell held only that the grounds for sum-
mary judgment must be contained in the motion.237
The appellant in Canadian Triton International Ltd. v. JFP Energy,
Inc.2 38 sought review of a trial court's summary judgment by writ of error.
Appellate Rule 45239 prevents review by writ of error if the petitioner
participated in person or by attorney in the "actual trial of the case. '240
The court held that appellant had not participated in the "actual trial of
the case" because there was no hearing where it could have participated,
it did not receive notice that the motion was set to be acted upon, and it
had not yet responded to the motion when the trial court ruled. 241 In
contrast, the court in Bowles v. Cook242 decided it had no jurisdiction to
consider an appeal of a summary judgment by writ of error because the
appellant there had participated in the "actual trial." Unlike the appel-
lant in Canadian Triton, the appellant in Bowles had time to respond to
the motion for summary judgment and did so long before the court
granted the motion.243 Although the appellant did not appear at a sum-
mary judgment hearing, the court deemed this absence insignificant:
"Taking part in all steps of a summary judgment proceeding other than
appearing at the hearing on the motion is participation. ' 244
Under Rule 166a(g),245 a trial court may continue a summary judgment
hearing to permit discovery if it appears from the affidavits of a party
opposing the motion that he cannot present by affidavit facts sufficient to
justify his opposition. According to the court in Levinthal v. Kelsey-Sey-
bold Clinic,246 this "rule clearly contemplates that the trial court will al-
232. 904 S.W.2d 628 (Tex. 1995) (per curium).
233. Id. at 629.
234. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(c).
235. 904 S.W.2d at 629.
236. 858 S.W.2d 337 (Tex. 1993).
237. 904 S.W.2d at 629.
238. 888 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1994, no writ).
239. TEX. R. App. P. 45(b).
240. Texas courts have generally held that parties participate in the "actual trial" when
they have notice of the summary judgment hearing and respond to the motion. See, e.g.,
Dillard v. Patel, 809 S.W.2d 509, 510, 512 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, writ denied);
Burton v. Home Indem. Co., 531 S.W.2d 665,667 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1975, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
241. 888 8.W.2d at 237.
242. 894 S.W.2d 65 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no writ).
243. Id. at 68.
244. Id. at 67 (citing Stubbs v. Stubbs, 685 S.W.2d 643, 645 (Tex. 1985)).
245. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(g).
246. 902 S.W.2d 508 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ).
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low the parties a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery before
granting a summary judgment. ' 247 Although a trial court can presume
that a plaintiff has investigated his own case prior to filing,24 8 the decision
in Levinthal makes clear that this presumption does not deny a plaintiff
the right to take advantage of the summary judgment continuance rule.249
Because the plaintiff diligently served discovery requests at the same time
he filed his original petition, and the case had been on file for only three
months when the summary judgment was granted, the court of appeals
held that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to continue the
motion for summary judgment hearing.250
When a summary judgment order does not recite the specific grounds
on which it was granted, a party appealing from that judgment must show
that each of the independent arguments alleged in the motion was insuffi-
cient to support the order.251 Richardson v. Johnson & Higgins252 cau-
tions that it is the court's written order, not an oral qualification or
explanation of the order, that counts for application of this rule.
Although the movant in Richardson included three grounds for summary
judgment in its motion, the trial court announced that it was denying the
first two grounds and granting the motion on the third ground only. The
appellant therefore limited her argument on appeal to this single ground.
The trial court's written order granting the motion, however, failed to
specify the particular ground on which the court based its action. Ac-
cordingly, the Richardson court affirmed the summary judgment on the
basis that appellant had failed to challenge either of the other two
grounds on which the summary judgment could have been based.253 The
court acknowledged the harshness of this rule, but noted its "prophylactic
effect of eliminating disputes over the plain meaning of a court's formal
order or judgment. '254
Finally, in Patterson v. First National Bank,255 the court held that a de-
fendant opposing a motion for summary judgment can rely on an affirma-
tive defense raised in her written response even if she has not yet
amended her answer to plead the affirmative defense.256 As used in Rule
247. Id at 512.
248. See Verkin v. Southwest Ctr. One, Ltd., 784 S.W.2d 92,95-96 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1989, writ denied).
249. 902 S.W.2d at 511.
250. Id at 512. According to the court, the following nonexclusive list of factors should
be considered in deciding whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the mo-
tion for continuance: "(1) the length of time the case has been on file; (2) the materiality of
the discovery sought; and (3) whether due diligence was exercised in obtaining the discov-
ery." Id. at 510 (citations omitted).
251. Gannon v. Baker, 830 S.W.2d 706, 709 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ
denied).
252. 905 S.W.2d 9 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied).
253. Id at 11.
254. Id. at 12.
255. No. 14-94-00358-CV, 1995 WL 517353 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.], Aug. 31,
1995, no writ).
256. Id at *3.
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166a(c), 257 "the term 'answer' is broadly construed to mean an answer to




The Texas Constitution and Texas Rules of Civil Procedure require that
a district court jury consist of twelve members unless not more than three
jurors die or "be disabled from sitting.1259 In McDaniel v. Yarbrough,260
the primary question presented was whether the trial court abused its
discretion by dismissing a juror, as "disabled from sitting," when she was
unable to return to the courthouse because of inclement weather. Hold-
ing that such action was erroneous, the supreme court equated the "dis-
abled from sitting" language with an actual physical or mental incapacity
on the part of a juror.261 Accordingly, the temporary inability of a juror
to return to court based on weather conditions did not meet that
standard.262
Batson263 challenges continued to be the subject of considerable discus-
sion among the appellate courts. In Benavides v. American Chrome &
Chemicals, Inc.,264 the appellate court observed that the Batson rule ap-
plies to Hispanics. 265 Further, the court held that a juror cannot be struck
on account of race even when race is not the sole factor but is merely one
factor in the decision to exercise a peremptory challenge. 266 In Domin-
guez v. State Farm Insurance Co.,267 the court expounded upon the proce-
dure for asserting a Batson challenge. The fundamental steps for
asserting a Batson challenge are: (1) the complaining party must first
present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion; (2) the burden then shifts to the striking party to rebut the assump-
tion of discrimination by producing a racially neutral explanation for each
peremptory challenge; and (3) the complaining party may then offer evi-
dence showing that the explanations are a sham or pretext for discrimina-
tion.2 68 In Dominguez, the attorney who had made the peremptory
challenges allowed himself to be sworn in and responded without objec-
tion to the trial court's questions about his reasons for striking panel
257. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(c).
258. 1995 WL 517353 at *3.
259. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 13; TEX. R. Civ. P. 292.
260. 898 S.W.2d 251 (Tex. 1995).
261. Id. at 253 (citing Houston & Texas Central Ry. Co. v. Waller, 56 Tex. 331 (1882)).
262. Id. at 253.
263. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
264. 893 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994), writ denied, 907 S.W.2d 516
(Tex. 1995) (per curiam).
265. Id. at 626.
266. Id. at 627.
267. 905 S.W.2d 713 (Tex. App.-E! Paso 1995, writ dism'd by agr.).
268. See, Texas Tech Univ. Health Science Ctr. v. Apodaca, 876 S.W.2d 402, 407-08
(Tex. App.-El Paso 1994, writ denied).
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members. Under those circumstances, the court of appeals held that he
had waived any objection that no prima facie case was made for discrimi-
natory use of peremptory challenges and, by failing to make an objection,
had conceded that the first step of the Batson procedure had been satis-
fied.269 Accordingly, the only issue on appeal was whether the striking
party had provided a racially neutral explanation for each of his peremp-
tory challenges. The court found that youth and unemployment of a pro-
spective juror were proper considerations in making a peremptory
strike. 270 On the other hand, the court rejected, as an explanation, the
claim that a prospective juror had "responded well" to the questions by
opposing counsel.271 The court noted that the record contained no verbal
response by the prospective juror in question and, further, there was no
specific, detailed description of the juror's appearance in the record.272
Under those circumstances, there was simply no basis in the record to
support the explanation.273
Two cases addressed the timing of challenges to the array of a jury
panel. In Benavides v. Soto,274 the plaintiff challenged the array of a jury
panel on the basis that it had been selected pursuant to a computer
method that had not been approved by the county commissioners' court
as required by statute, and the computer program did not employ a ran-
dom selection program. On appeal, the court held that both points of
error had been waived because they were not presented until a motion
for new trial was filed.275 The general rule is that errors in the process
used to select the jury array or panel are waived if the complaint is first
made in a motion for new trial.276 According to the court, "[t]his rule is
primarily designed to prevent a party from taking his chance on a
favorable verdict and then obtaining a second trial by reason of some
irregularity in the array selection process. '277 More importantly, the
court held that this rule applied not only when the party is aware of the
irregularity but also when the party could have discovered it by
inquiry.278
In contrast, the court in Mann v. Ramirez279 held that, under the facts
of that case, a motion for mistrial filed after the verdict was proper to
raise a challenge to the array of the jury panel.280 In this case, the district
court clerk had improperly excused prospective jurors for nonstatutory
reasons. In addition, the district court clerk was having an "intimate rela-
269. Dominguez, 905 S.W.2d at 716.
270. Id. at 717.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 717-18.
274. 893 S.W.2d 69 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, no writ).




279. 905 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1995, writ denied).
280. Id at 280.
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tionship" with the corporate representative of the defendant. Even
though these matters were not brought to the attention of the trial court
until after the verdict had been rendered, the appellate court held that
the objections to the jury panel had not been waived. 281 In reaching that
result, the appellate court gave particular weight to the fact that the plain-
tiff's attorney questioned the district court clerk, prior to voir dire, about
the small number of jurors who had appeared and was assured that the
number was affected by appropriate statutory exemptions.28 2 Under
those circumstances, the court stated that the plaintiff could not be
faulted for relying on the assurances of the district court clerk's office
regarding the jury-assembly procedure and had diligently pursued the er-
ror through their motion for mistrial as soon as irregularities became
apparent.2 83
In order to preserve error regarding the trial court's failure to remove a
prospective juror for cause, a party must give notice to the trial court of
two things prior to exercising any peremptory challenges: (1) the party
must inform the trial court that it will exhaust all peremptory challenges;
and (2) the party must inform the trial court that after exercising all of its
peremptory challenges, specific objectionable jurors will remain on thejury list.284 In Brown v. Pittsburg Corning Corp.,285 the court held that,
under this test, the appellants' point of error was waived because they
failed to bring the matter to the attention of the trial court before they
had delivered their list of peremptory challenges to the trial court.2 86 In
Clark v. Harris County Sheriffs Department, 87 the court similarly held
that a party had waived its challenge for cause.2 88 In this regard, the com-
plaining party had "reurged" her challenges for cause to seven specified
jurors prior to exercising peremptory strikes. The court of appeals, how-
ever, held this was insufficient even though it was admittedly reasonable
to deduce from counsel's statement that there would be objectionable ju-
rors remaining on the jury.2 89 Rather, the court of appeals endorsed the
view that the manner for preserving error should remain clear without
calling upon the courts to deduce or infer meanings from counsel's
statements.290
In Rabson v. Rabson,291 the court addressed questions as to the
number of jurors that are required in trials in statutory probate court.
The court held that, with respect to claims that are within the probate
281. Id.
282. Id. at 279.
283. Id. at 279-80.
284. Hallett v. Houston Northwest Medical Ctr., 689 S.W.2d 888, 890 (Tex. 1985).
285. 909 S.W.2d 101 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no writ).
286. Id. at 104. Although the record did not present for review the specific moment of
delivery, the court still held that the appellate's objection was not "timely." Id.
287. 889 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ).
288. Id. at 570.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. 906 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, writ denied).
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court's exclusive jurisdiction, they may be tried to a jury of six.292 In
cases involving claims both within the probate court's exclusive jurisdic-
tion and its concurrent jurisdiction with the district court, however, the
appellate court held that a jury of twelve was required. 293
B. JURY QUESTIONS
Two supreme court cases during the Survey period reflect a more leni-
ent attitude on the part of the court with respect to preservation of error
related to the jury charge. In Alaniz v. Jones & Neuse, Inc. ,294 plaintiff
submitted to the trial court a "complete requested charge" shortly after
the trial began. The trial court submitted the proposed charge with the
exception of a reference to future lost profits. Plaintiff objected on the
record to the omission.
On appeal, the court of appeals held that plaintiff had failed to pre-
serve his objection by including his request in a complete charge, by sub-
mitting his request before trial and not "after the charge was given to the
parties," and by not making his request "separate and apart from [his]
objections. ' 295 Disagreeing with the court of appeals, the supreme court
first noted that plaintiff's request was "written" as required by Rule
273.296 The court explained that Rule 273" does not prohibit including a
request in a complete charge as long as it is not obscured. ' 297 The court
further found that, although Rule 273 speaks in terms of a request for
questions or instructions being submitted "after the charge," 298 it does
not mean that requests may only be presented after the charge has actu-
ally been given to the parties by the trial court.299 Finally, the court con-
cluded that plaintiff's written request was separate from his oral objection
and, therefore, error had been preserved. 3°° In reaching these conclu-
sions, the court emphasized that the requirements for preserving error as
to a jury charge should "be applied in a common sense manner to serve
the purposes of the rules, rather than in a technical manner which defeats
them., 301
In Lester v. Logan,30 2 the plaintiff submitted his questions and instruc-
tions on a single page, which consisted of a question on the implied war-
ranty of fitness for a particular purpose with accompanying definitions for
the terms implied warranty, producing cause, course of dealing, and usage
292. Id. at 562.
293. Id. at 562-63; see TEX. Govr. CODE ANN. § 25.00261 (Vernon Supp. 1995).
294. 907 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam).
295. Alaniz v. Jones & Neuse, Inc., 878 S.W.2d 244, 245 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christ
1994), writ denied, 907 S.W.2d 450 (1995).
296. TEX. R. Civ. P. 273.
297. Alaniz, 907 S.W.2d at 451.
298. TEX. R. Civ. P. 273.
299. Alaniz, 907 S.W.2d at 451.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 452. Nevertheless, despite being properly presented, error was denied on
want of merit. Id.
302. 907 S.W.2d 452 (Tex. 1995).
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of trade. The court of appeals found that the plaintiff's submission was
improper. Although denying the application for writ of error, the
supreme court expressly disapproved of this holding and, therefore, im-
plied that it is appropriate for a party to submit a question, along with
accompanying instructions, on the same page rather than separately. 30 3
In regard to the foregoing, the practitioner should be aware that the
supreme court is in the process of substantially revising Rules 270
through 278304 which govern the jury charge procedure. One of the po-
tential areas of revision is the simplification of the steps necessary to pre-
serve objections to the charge. It is anticipated that these revisions will
be completed during 1996.
A number of cases considered the effect of submitting erroneous in-
structions or questions to the jury. In Reinhart v. Young,305 the trial court
submitted an instruction on unavoidable accident in this negligence case.
Although not expressly deciding that such action was erroneous, the
supreme court did caution that, except in certain types of cases, the trial
judge should refrain from submitting this type of instruction. 306 The
court explained that the only purpose for the instruction was to ensure
that the jury would understand that "they do not necessarily have to find
one or the other parties" to the lawsuit is to blame for the occurrence in
question, and the instruction is most often used to inquire about the
causal effect of some physical condition or circumstance, such as weather
conditions.30 7 The court noted that this type of instruction increases the
risk that the jury will be misled or confused by the perception that the
instruction represents a separate issue distinct from the general principles
of negligence. 308
Nevertheless, the court did not find the error, if any, in submitting the
instruction to be harmful.309 In this regard, the court noted, among other
things, that the jury charge had also contained an instruction on the doc-
trine of sudden emergency which reiterated much of the unavoidable ac-
cident instruction.310 Since the plaintiff had made no objection to the
instruction on sudden emergency, the court had difficulty attributing an
improper verdict to the unavoidable accident instruction. 311
In Crawford v. Hope,312 the court of appeals was somewhat more en-
thusiastic about an unavoidable accident instruction. In rejecting an ar-
gument that such an instruction constituted a comment on the weight of
the evidence, the court noted that "every jury instruction and question
303. Id. at 453.
304. TEX. R. Civ. P. 270-278.
305. 906 S.W.2d 471 (Tex. 1995).
306. Id. at 472.
307. Id. (quoting Yarbrough v. Berner, 467 S.W.2d 188, 192 (Tex. 1971).
308. Id.
309. Id. at 474.
310. Reinhart, 906 S.W.2d 471, 474 (Tex. 1995).
311. Id.
312. 898 S.W.2d 937 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1995, writ denied).
1398 [Vol. 49
CIVIL PROCEDURE
comments in some way upon the evidence. '313 According to the court,
"submitting inferential rebuttals, such as unavoidable accident, [is] not
tantamount to informing the jury" that one party's evidence is more cred-
ible.314 Rather, "[ilt simply educates the jury on the applicable elements
of law and assists it in understanding the respective contentions. '315
In City of Brownsville v. Alvarado,316 a prisoner committed suicide in
the city jail. His, parents thereafter brought a wrongful death and survival
action against the city. At the trial, the jury was first asked to determine
if the negligence of the city caused the prisoner's death and, second, to
determine if the negligence or intentional conduct of the prisoner proxi-
mately caused his own death. If it answered both questions in the affirm-
ative, then the jury was to allocate the appropriate percentages of
negligence or intentional conduct between the city and the prisoner. The
court of appeals determined that the submission of the second question,
inquiring about the prisoner's own conduct, was improper due to a statu-
tory provision which prohibits the use of suicide as a defense in certain
circumstances. 317 The supreme court disagreed.318 The court observed
that inclusion of an improper jury question is harmless error if the jury's
answers to other questions render the improper question immaterial and
if the submission of the immaterial issue does not confuse or mislead the
jury.319 Given that the jury found, in response to the first question, that
the city did not proximately cause the prisoner's death, the court deter-
mined that the second issue was immaterial. 320 Further, the second ques-
tion regarding the prisoner's own conduct was not ambiguous or
misleading because the cause of death and the fact of suicide were never
in doubt; the jury was simply asked to identify who was responsible. 32'
In Lone Star Gas Co. v. Lemond,322 a products liability case, the trial
court added a sentence to the form for a jury charge on a marketing de-
fect claim as found in the Texas Pattern Jury Charges.323 The trial court's
additional sentence stated "[a] seller's duty to warn arises only where the
dangers to be warned of are reasonably foreseeable and are such that a
consumer cannot reasonably be expected to be aware of them. 324
Although the supreme court has emphasized in the past that surplus in-
structions are to be discouraged, 325 it did not find the addition of the
313. Id. at 942.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. 897 S.W.2d 750 (Tex. 1995).
317. Id. at 752; TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 93.001 (Vernon 1995).
318. Alvarado, 897 S.W.2d at 753.
319. Id. at 752.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. 897 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. 1995).
323. Id. at 756; 3 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES PJC 71.06
(1996).
324. Lone Star Gas, 897 S.W.2d at 756.
325. Accord v. General Motors Corp., 669 S.W.2d 111 (Tex. 1984); Lemos v. Montez,
680 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. 1984).
19961 1399
SMU LAW REVIEW
extra sentence to be harmful error.326 Among other things, the court
noted that the sentence was entirely consistent with other portions of the
charge and, accordingly, the court did not see how "it could have nudged
the jury improperly. '327
The trial court in George Grubb Enterprises v. Bien328 followed the
Pattern Jury Charge instruction on exemplary damages. The court, how-
ever, included a statement to the effect that in determining the amount of
exemplary damages, the jury could not consider the assets, wealth, or
profitability of any company affiliated with the defendant corporation un-
less they determined that those companies were operated as a single busi-
ness enterprise. The court defined a "single business enterprise" as
existing when two or more corporations associate together and, rather
than operating as separate entities, integrate their resources to achieve a
common business purpose.329
Finding the trial court's action to be improper, the supreme court ex-
pressed skepticism that it would "ever" be proper for a jury to consider
the wealth of a related corporate entity, which had not been joined as a
defendant, in deciding exemplary damages.330 In any event, the court de-
termined that the instruction was erroneous because it did not specify all
of the relevant factors that are necessary in order to disregard corporate
structure.331
Finally, the supreme court in State Farm Life Insurance Co. v. Beas-
ton332 considered the parameters of Rule 279.333 This rule provides, in
general, that when an element of a claim or defense is omitted from the
jury charge without objection and the trial court makes no written find-
ings as to the element, such omitted element shall be deemed found by
the court in such a manner as to "support" the judgment. 334 In this case,
the jury found that the plaintiff had sustained mental anguish as a result
of unfair deceptive acts and practices of the defendant. Such a determi-
nation was not conditioned upon any finding as to whether that conduct
was committed knowingly, a necessary element. On appeal, the plaintiff
contended that defendant could not complain because a finding of
"knowing conduct" should be deemed to have been made under Rule
279. Disagreeing with this contention, the supreme court noted that the
trial court's judgment expressly excluded any award for mental anguish
damages.335 Thus, the finding of "knowing conduct" in support of an
award for mental anguish damages could not be deemed because such a
finding would not "support" the judgment that was rendered in the court
326. Lone Star Gas, 897 S.W.2d at 756-57.
327. Id. at 756.
328. 900 S.W.2d 337 (Tex. 1995).
329. Id. at 338.
330. Id. at 339.
331. Id. (citing Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270, 273 (Tex. 1986)).
332. 907 S.W.2d 430 (Tex. 1995).
333. TEx. R. Civ. P. 279.
334. Id.





A number of interesting points regarding judgments were addressed
during the Survey period. In Bonham State Bank v. Beadle,337 a bank
obtained a $1,650,000 judgment in North Carolina against its borrowers
under certain notes and guaranties. Subsequently, the debtors obtained a
$75,000 judgment against the bank in connection with a sequestration
proceeding in Texas. Thereafter, the bank filed a declaratory judgment
action seeking a declaration regarding its ability to offset the prior North
Carolina judgment against the Texas judgment.
The supreme court concluded that this was an appropriate use of the
declaratory judgment procedure. In this regard, the court concluded that
the suit was not being used to obtain a review or modification of either
judgment, but was solely to determine the rights of offset. 338 Further, the
court rejected the borrowers' argument that the claim of setoff should
have been made in the Texas action. The court reasoned that, until the
rendition of judgment in the Texas suit, the Bank's right of setoff did not
exist.339 Further, the court concluded that the Bank's right of setoff was
not a compulsory counterclaim in the Texas suit because it was "in-
dependent of the merits of either of the underlying judgments. '340 More-
over, the right to recover the amount owed under a prior judgment,
unlike a counterclaim, is not factually dependent on the disposition of the
second lawsuit given that a judgment has already been rendered. 341
In America's Favorite Chicken Co. v. Galvan,342 the court of appeals
explored the power of the trial court to enter a nunc pro tunc judgment.
In this case, plaintiff's attorney "accidently" moved for a nonsuit "with
prejudice," which the trial court granted. Approximately six months
later, and after the trial court's plenary jurisdiction expired, plaintiff
moved for a judgment nunc pro tunc, which the trial court granted and
changed the order of nonsuit to read "without" instead of "with" preju-
dice.343 Finding this action to be erroneous, the court of appeals es-
poused the familiar proposition that "clerical" errors rather than judicial
errors may be corrected pursuant to a court's nunc pro tunc powers at
any time.344 The court concluded that any error made by the attorney in
drafting the motion for nonsuit with prejudice did not constitute a clerical
error; rather, any recitation or provision included in a judgment due to an
attorney's mistake is part of the court's judgment as rendered and is,
336. Id.
337. 907 S.W.2d 465 (Tex. 1995).
338. Id. at 468.
339. Id at 469.
340. Id. at 470.
341. Id.
342. 897 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1995, writ denied).




therefore, a judicial error as a matter of law.345
In Brazos Valley Community Action Agency v. Robison,346 plaintiff
brought a wrongful death and survival action against a bus driver and his
employer. Subsequently, the plaintiff obtained a default judgment
against the driver at a hearing for which the employer received no notice.
Thereafter, the trial court entered summary judgment against the em-
ployer on the ground that the default judgment against the driver estab-
lished all facts necessary to show the employer's liability. Disagreeing
with this conclusion, the appellate court noted that it was "fundamentally
unfair" to use a default judgment to bind an employer based on an em-
ployee's default, particularly when the employer never received notice of
the default hearing and did not appear for it.347
The court in Tinney v. Willingham348 addressed the power of the trial
court to enter a judgment that varies from the terms of a settlement. In
this case, the parties agreed to settle their dispute and dictated the terms
of their settlement into the record. Subsequently, one of the parties filed
a motion for judgment in which they requested the trial court sign and
enter a judgment attached to the motion. The opposing party objected to
the judgment on the basis that it did not conform to the settlement agree-
ment announced in open court. Despite the objection, the trial court en-
tered the judgment. Finding this to be erroneous, the court of appeals
stated that if a trial court intends to render judgment based on the par-
ties' settlement agreement, the "signed judgment must literally comply
with the terms of the agreement." 349 Because the judgment conflicted
with the settlement agreement, the court held that the judgment was
unenforceable. 350
XII. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
Rule 41 of Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure351 generally provides
that the time for filing an appeal is within 30 days after the judgment is
signed, or within 90 days after the judgment is signed "if a timely motion
for new trial has been filed by any party." In Gomez v. Texas Department
of Criminal Justice,352 the plaintiff filed a "bill of review" within 30 days
after an adverse judgment had been entered against him. Noting that
plaintiff's bill of review had "assailed" the trial court's judgment, the
supreme court held that this pleading was sufficient to extend the appel-
late time table from 30 to 90 days, even though it was not described as a
345. Id. at 879.
346. 900 S.W.2d 843 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1995, writ denied).
347. Id. at 845.
348. 897 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1995, no writ).
349. Id. at 544.
350. Id.
351. TEX. R. APP. P. 41(a)(1).
352. 896 S.W.2d 176 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam).
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motion for new trial.35 3 In Spellman v. Hoang,354 the losing party filed a
motion for new trial within the requisite period but did not pay the statu-
tory filing fee for the motion.355 The court of appeals concluded the date
of tender of the motion controlled for appellate purposes and, accord-
ingly, the motion was sufficient to extend the appellate deadline.35 6
Pursuant to Rule 329b(e), a trial court has plenary power to grant a
new trial or to modify, correct, or reform a judgment within 30 days after
the judgment is signed.357 If a motion for new trial is filed, the trial
court's plenary power is extended until 30 days after the motion is over-
ruled either by written order or by operation of law.35 8 In Childs v. L.M.
Healthcare, Inc.,359 the trial court "rendered" judgment on January 28,
1994, against the plaintiff. The plaintiff thereafter filed a motion for new
trial on February 7, 1994, and a hearing was held on March 3, 1994. At
the hearing, the trial court "signed" the January 28, 1994, judgment and
also signed an order denying plaintiff's motion for new trial. Subse-
quently, plaintiff filed a motion to modify the judgment, and the trial
court modified the judgment more than 30 days after March 3, 1994.
Under these circumstances, the court held that the trial court acted im-
properly because it lost plenary power to modify the judgment once 30
days had transpired after denial of the motion for new trial.3 60 The court
reasoned that if it were to hold otherwise, then a party could create indef-
inite delay through carefully timed filings of subsequent motions to
modify.361
XIII. SEALING OF COURT RECORDS
The court in Marks v. Feldman3 62 condemned an attempt to circumvent
the requirements for sealing court records under Rule 76a3 63 based on
the allegation that grand jury secrecy mandated a different standard.3 64
In an action filed to perpetuate the testimony of Feldman, Marks' ac-
countant, the United States objected on the grounds of a pending grand
jury investigation in which Marks was a target and Feldman a potential
witness. At the government's request, the district court conducted an ex-
parte, in camera hearing with the government's attorney only and further
ordered the record of such hearing sealed. The court of appeals held that
353. Id. at 176-77.
354. 887 S.W.2d 480 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1994, no writ).
355. Id at 481; TEx. GovT. CODE ANN. § 51.317 (Vernon 1988).
356. Spellman, 887 S.W.2d at 482. Compare Jamar v. Patterson, 868 S.W.2d 318, 319(Tex. 1993); Arndt v. Arndt, 709 S.W.2d 281, 282 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986,
no writ).
357. TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(e).
358. Faulkner v. Culver, 851 S.W.2d 187, 188 (Tex. 1993).
359. 908 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1995, no writ).
360. Id. at 595.
361. Id.
362. 910 S.W.2d 73 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1995, no writ).
363. TEx. R. Civ. P. 76a.
364. Marks, 910 S.W.2d at 74-75.
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the ex-parte, in camera hearing violated the United States and Texas con-
stitutions, the Texas procedural rules, and Texas case law.365 Further, the
court held that the sealing of the record was improper given the failure of
the trial court to adhere to the requirements of Rule 76a,366 and that
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) 367 could not be relied on as a
basis for ignoring those requirements. 368
XIV. DISQUALIFICATION AND RECUSAL OF JUDGES
Section 74.053 of the Texas Government Code permits a litigant to dis-
qualify an assigned or visiting judge if he objects before the first hearing
or trial over which the assigned judge is to preside.369 Earlier decisions
have held that the objection is too late if it comes after the visiting judge
makes any ruling in the case, even on a motion for continuance. 370 Mor-
ris v. Short371 reiterates this rule and also holds that an oral objection is
insufficient.372 Although the code does not explicitly state that the objec-
tion must be in writing, the Morris court implied such a requirement in
the code's use of the words "files" and "filed. ' 373 To properly object to a
visiting judge, therefore, the party must file a written objection, even if it
is a handwritten one.374 In somewhat of a contrast to Morris, the court in
Lee v. Bachus375 held that a party does not waive its objection to a visit-
ing judge by failing to register the objection before that judge presided at
a docket call which set the case for trial at a future date. The court con-
cluded that a mere docket call at which thirty-seven cases were set for
trial in the future did not qualify as a pretrial hearing or trial, as those
terms are used in the statute, and did not constitute calling the case "to"
trial as contemplated by section 74.053.376
In Amateur Athletic Foundation v. Hoffnan,377 a litigant timely filed his
handwritten objection to a visiting judge who had been assigned to hear
the matter. This objection failed to identify the challenged judge by name
and, instead, objected only generally to "the visiting judge." Neverthe-
365. Id. at 78.
366. TEX. R. CIv. P. 76a.
367. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e).
368. Marks, 910 S.W.2d at 78.
369. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 74.053(c) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
370. See, e.g., Money v. Jones, 766 S.W.2d 307, 308 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ de-
nied) (discussed in Ernest E. Figari, Jr., A. Erin Dwyer & Donald Colleluori, Annual Sur-
vey of Texas Law: Texas Civil Procedure, 44 Sw. L.J. 551-52 (1990).
371. 902 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. App,-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied).
372. Id. at 569.
373. Id.; see TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 74.053(b) (Vernon Supp. 1996) ("If a party...
files a timely objection"); see also id. § 74.053(c) ("[o]bjection ... must be filed before the
first hearing or trial").
374. 902 S.W.2d at 569.
375. 900 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1995, no writ).
376. Id. at 392 (citing Lewis v. Leftwich, 775 S.W.2d 848, 849 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989,
orig. proceeding)).
377. 893 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, no writ).
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less, with one judge dissenting,378 the court held that the blanket objec-
tion was sufficient. 379
Texas courts have repeatedly held that appellate judges are not subject
to disqualification solely on the basis that they received campaign contri-
butions from an attorney representing one of the parties to the appeal. 380
The appellants in Rogers v. Bradley381 cited an even more tenuous con-
nection with a political campaign as grounds for disqualification. They
moved to recuse four justices of the Texas Supreme Court who were de-
picted in a campaign video produced for the 1992 general election by
TEX-PAC, the political action committee of the Texas Medical Associa-
tion. Among other things, the TEX-PAC video highlighted the case in-
volving the appellee Dr. Bradley and contained his plea to voters to elect
"independent" and "fair" judges to the supreme court. It also appeared,
however, that the content and circumstances of the video were outside
the control of any of the candidates or existing jurists portrayed in the
video. Therefore, the court denied appellants' motion to recuse as to
each of the four justices challenged. 382
The decision in Rogers is noteworthy because of the "Declaration of
Recusal" filed by Justice Gammage and Justice Enoch's response to that
declaration. Although he was not challenged in the motion to recuse,
Justice Gammage unilaterally recused himself from participation in all
matters related to the case because he too was depicted briefly in the
video. 383 In his "Declaration of Recusal" Justice Gammage opined that
Rule 18b(2)(a) 384 requires recusal whenever a judge's impartiality might
reasonably be questioned, even if the judge has not engaged in any biased
or prejudicial conduct. 385 Therefore, although he had nothing to do with
the videotape, Justice Gammage believed his recusal was necessary be-
cause a reasonable member of the public with knowledge of all the facts
in the public domain would doubt that the judges portrayed favorably in
the TEX-PAC video were actually impartial. 386 Justice Gammage also
378. The dissenting judge observed that an objection which does not positively identify
the judge would leave unanswered numerous questions, including whether the party had
used its one objection against a retired judge or only one of its unlimited objections to a
former judge. Id. at 604 (Whittington, J., dissenting). Compare TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN.
§ 74.053(b) (Vernon Supp. 1995) (only one objection allowed for retired judge) with
§ 74.053(d) (unlimited objections as to former judges who are not retired judges).
379. Hoffman, 893 S.W.2d at 603.
380. See River Road Neighborhood Ass'n v. South Texas Sports, Inc., 673 S.W.2d 952(Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ) and Rocha v. Ahmad, 662 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. App.-
San Antonio 1983, no writ) (discussed in Ernest E. Figari, Jr., et al., Annual Survey of
Texas Law: Texas Civil Procedure, 39 Sw. L.J. 419, 445 (1985)).
381. 909 S.W.2d 872 (Tex. 1995).
382. Id. at 880.
383. Id. at 873-74 (Gammage, J., Declaration of Recusal).
384. TEX. R. Civ. P. 18b(2)(a) (requiring a judge to "recuse himself in any proceeding
in which ... his impartiality might reasonably be questioned"). Pursuant to TEX. R. App.
P. 15a, the strictures for trial judges announced in Rule 18b apply equally to appellate
justices.




articulated a general rule he would apply that requires recusal whenever
(1) a person has sought to engender political support for a judicial candi-
date, (2) the effort is made through a medium intended to be widely cir-
culated, and (3) that effort ties the success of the chosen candidate to the
probable result in a pending or impending case.387
Responding to Justice Gammage's declaration, Justice Enoch noted
that the case presented no grounds for constitutional or rule-based dis-
qualification. 388 The standards for recusal and disqualification focus on
the conduct of the judge that is being examined, not the conduct of some
third party.389 Therefore, a judge should not recuse himself or herself
merely because others had engaged in normal, even vigorous, campaign
activities. 390 Indeed, given the realities of current political campaigns,
Justice Enoch concluded that a judge's appearance in a campaign video,
standing alone, would not cast doubt in the mind of a reasonable person
about that judge's impartiality.391
XV. DISQUALIFICATION OF COUNSEL
Satellite skirmishes in civil litigation continue to occur over the disqual-
ification of counsel pursuant to Rule 1.09 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules
of Professional Conduct.392 In Texaco, Inc. v. Garcia,393 the Texas
Supreme Court held that counsel who had represented a former client in
106 litigation matters over a seven year period was disqualified from rep-
resenting another client in a matter adverse to the former client. Reiter-
ating the rule it first announced in NCNB Texas National Bank v.
Coker,394 the court stated that a movant seeking disqualification under
the substantial relationship test must prove that the facts of the two rep-
resentations are so related "that it creates a genuine threat that confi-
dences revealed to his former counsel will be divulged to his present
adversary. ' 395 Because the allegations in the Garcia case involved liabil-
ity issues, scientific issues, and defenses and strategies that were similar to
those presented in a prior suit in which counsel had represented the for-
mer client, the trial judge abused his discretion in denying the motion to
387. Id.
388. Id. at 879; see TEX. CONST. art. V, § 11; TEX. R. Civ. P. 18b.
389. 909 S.W.2d at 881.
390. Id. at 882.
391. Id. at 883. Justice Enoch also described the contrary rule espoused by Justice
Gammage as unworkable, observing that it would totally disrupt the efficient administra-
tion of justice in Texas because all nine justices of the supreme court would be required to
recuse themselves simply because TEX-PAC was too pointed in its campaign activities. Id.
at 883-84.
392. TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF. CONDuCr 1.09(a)(3) (1989), reprinted in TEX. Gov'T
CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A, art. 10, § 9 (Vernon Supp. 1995) (lawyer shall not take
representation that is adverse to a former client if the new matter is the same or a substan-
tially related matter).
393. 891 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. 1995).
394. 765 S.W.2d 398, 400 (Tex. 1989).




In Henderson v. Floyd,397 which was decided the same day as Garcia,
the supreme court held that the presumption of shared confidences aris-
ing under the substantial relationship test cannot be rebutted by a show-
ing that no confidential information was disclosed.398 Thus, a firm who
hires a lawyer who formerly represented the adverse party in the same or
substantially related matters cannot avoid disqualification by "shielding"
the newly hired lawyer from any possible contact with the litigation. 399
For similar reasons, the court in Centerline Industries v. Knize400 held that
a lawyer who has given advice in a substantially related matter must be
disqualified whether or not he has even gained any confidences as a result
of the prior representation. Agreeing with a recent decision of the Fifth
Circuit,40 1 the court observed that the substantial relationship test is con-
cerned with both a lawyer's duties of confidentiality and loyalty.402
Therefore, because the lawyer admitted that the present case was sub-
stantially related to the matter in which he formerly represented the ad-
verse party, he was disqualified notwithstanding his contention that all of
the confidences he gained from the prior representation had already be-
come public knowledge. 40 3
At least one court has decided that a stricter standard for disqualifica-
tion applies in the joint defense context. The plaintiff in Rio Hondo Im-
plement Co. v. Euresti40 4 originally sued two defendants. After one of
these defendants settled, the lawyer who represented that defendant en-
tered into a new law partnership with the attorney representing the plain-
tiff in the case. The non-settling defendant then moved to disqualify
plaintiff's counsel on the basis that his new partner, by attending joint
defense meetings that occurred before his former client settled, had
gained confidential and privileged information of the remaining defend-
ant. In a case of first impression, the Rio Hondo court held that a party
claiming the joint defense privilege as a basis for disqualification "must
establish in an evidentiary hearing that confidential information was actu-
ally shared. '40 5 The court refused to apply the irrebuttable presumption
that applies in other contexts arising under the substantial relationship
396. Id at 257.
397. 891 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. 1995).
398. Id. at 254.
399. The rule announced for attorneys in Floyd, therefore, appears to be different than
the standard for non-lawyer employees the supreme court adopted last year in Phoenix
Founders, Inc. v. Marshall, 887 S.W.2d 831 (Tex. 1994) (presumption that nonlawyer who
switches sides in ongoing litigation will share confidential information with members of
new firm is rebuttable), discussed in 1995 Annual Survey, supra note 21, at 1648-49.
400. 894 S.W.2d 874, 876 (Tex. App.-Waco 1995, no writ).
401. In re American Airlines, 972 F.2d 605, 619 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S.
912 (1993).
402. Knize, 894 S.W.2d at 876.
403. Id.
404. 903 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1995, no writ).
405. Id. at 132. In so holding, the court adopted the reasoning of Fred Weber, Inc. v.
Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602, 608 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 905, (1978), in which
the court noted that "[a]bsent an attorney-client relationship, no court has applied the
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test because there had never been any attorney-client relationship be-
tween the movant and counsel for the co-defendant, and therefore Rule
1.09 did not technically apply.406 Therefore, because defendant's testi-
mony did not reveal with any specificity the confidences allegedly re-
vealed to her co-defendant, disqualification was inappropriate. 40 7
XVI. MISCELLANEOUS
A. GUARDIAN AD LITEM
Rule 173408 vests the trial court with the authority to appoint a guard-
ian ad litem for a minor who "is represented by a next friend or guardian
who appears to the court to have an interest adverse to such minor. ,409 In
Brownsville-Valley Regional Medical Center v. Gamez,410 the supreme
court considered the limitations on that authority. In this case, a group of
family members (parents and their daughter) sued a hospital and a doctor
for medical malpractice. Subsequently, the parties settled the case and
the settlement payment was to be apportioned between the parents and a
trust created for the benefit of the daughter. After settlement negotia-
tions were complete, the trial court appointed an attorney as the daugh-
ter's guardian ad litem to represent her interest in the settlement. In
approving the settlement, the trial court awarded the guardian ad litem
not only the fees that he had spent on the case but also fees for services to
be performed by him for a 22 year period following the settlement (the
duration of the trust).
Finding that the trial court had abused its discretion by awarding the
guardian ad litem fees for post-litigation services, the supreme court ob-
served that representation of a guardian ad litem is limited to matters
related to the suit for which he or she is appointed and, accordingly, the
trial court "can appoint an ad litem during litigation to protect the inter-
ests of the minor when a conflict of interests arises."'411 In this case, once
the settlement was approved, there was no evidence of any ongoing con-
flict of interest that continued to exist.412 Accordingly, the supreme court
concluded that the trial court should have dismissed the guardian ad litem
[irrefutable presumption that confidences were disclosed] inherent in Canon 4." Euresti,
903 S.W.2d at 132.
406. 903 S.W.2d at 131. The court also took a look at Rule 1.05, which prohibits using
confidential information relating to a client to that client's disadvantage unless the client
consents. See TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF. CONDUCr 1.05(b)(2) (1989), reprinted in TEX.
Gov'T CODE ANN. tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A, art. 10, § 9 (Vernon Supp. 1995).
407. Euresti, 903 S.W.2d at 132. The court implicitly acknowledged the difficulty a
party will have in satisfying the required evidentiary standard when it observed that plain-
tiff's counsel was "understandably vague" in her trial testimony about the shared confi-
dences for fear of waiving the privilege she was attempting to protect. Id. The court also
considered the attorney's testimony by sealed affidavit, however, and thereby presumably
approved the use of this mechanism as a means of furnishing the requisite evidence. Id.
408. TEX. R. Civ. P. 173.
409. Id. (emphasis added).
410. 894 S.W.2d 753 (Tex. 1995).




at that point and should not have awarded fees for post-litigation serv-
ices.413 The court further noted that the probate code contains appropri-
ate procedures for appointment of a guardian, if necessary, to protect a
minor's interest after litigation has been concluded.
414
B. CONTEMPT
The supreme court also had occasion to consider one of the trial practi-
tioner's favorite subjects-contempt. In Ex parte Carney,4 15 a judgment
creditor obtained a turnover order against a defendant which required
him, among other things, to turn over certain specified documents to the
sheriff. Subsequently, the judgment creditor filed a motion for contempt
claiming that defendant "had not forwarded to the Sheriff all documents
and items ordered" for the turnover.416 The trial court issued a show
cause order that referred to the motion for contempt and later held the
defendant in contempt. The supreme court, however, considered the mo-
tion to be deficient because it did not state how defendant had failed to
comply with the order.417 Apparently, the supreme court was of the view
that the motion should have stated with particularity the documents and
items that the defendant had not turned over as required by the order.
418
In Ex parte Chambers,419 the supreme court provided guidance as to
the ability of trial courts to hold officers of a corporation in contempt for
the failure of the corporation to comply with a court order. In this case,
the trial court entered an order directing the defendant corporation to
pay a fine, but it did not designate any particular person to carry out the
order. Nonetheless, the supreme court held that the order was suffi-
ciently specific to give rise to personal duties on the part of the corpora-
tion's sole officer, director, and shareholder to obey that order and to
support a judgment of contempt. 420 The court, however, did hold that,
even if a corporation fails to comply with a court order, "it does not nec-
essarily follow that all corporate agents or officers are in contempt."
421
Rather, "there must be evidence in the record that the corporate agent
charged with contempt was somehow personally connected with defying
the authority of the court or disobeying its lawful decree.
422
Although the supreme court found that the particular officer in this
case had the requisite authority and involvement, it concluded that a con-
tempt order was not warranted. 423 In this regard, the corporate officer
demonstrated that the corporation did not have sufficient assets to pay
413. Id.
414. Id. at 756-57.
415. 903 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. 1995).
416. Id. at 346.
417. Id.
418. Id
419. 898 S.W.2d 257 (Tex. 1995).
420. Id at 260.
421. Id. at 261.
422. Id.
423. Id. at 261-62.
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the fine at any point subsequent to the date of the order and, accordingly,
the high court held that the involuntary inability of the corporation to
comply with the order was a valid defense to criminal contempt.424
C. ABATEMENT
The courts of appeals struggled with the issue of whether a writ of man-
damus can issue in connection with the trial court's ruling on a plea in
abatement. In Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Flores,425 the court determined
that a plea in abatement should have been granted in a later-filed action
because another court had acquired "dominant jurisdiction" in the a prior
case.426 Nonetheless, the court held that a refusal to abate was an inci-
dental ruling for which the aggrieved party had an adequate remedy by
appeal and, accordingly, a writ of mandamus could not be issued. 427 In
Dallas Fire Insurance Co. v. Davis,428 the appellate court determined that
the trial court acquired dominant jurisdiction over an insurer's declara-
tory judgment action and therefore lacked discretion to abate that action
in favor of a later-filed action seeking to collect against the insurance
policy.429 Unlike Flores, the court in Davis determined that, although
mandamus ordinarily does not lie to correct an incidental ruling related
to abatement, it is appropriate in cases where a trial court with dominant
jurisdiction abates a first-filed action for an indefinite period of time;
thus, mandamus will lie to compel the court to proceed to trial.430
D. ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
In Martin v. Black,431 the court faced an issue that many trial attorneys
will find familiar. After a two-day mediation, the parties had reached an
"agreement," which was memorialized in "term sheets" signed by the
parties and their counsel.432 The term sheets contained a provision pro-
viding that "the parties' understandings are subject to securing documen-
tation satisfactory to the parties. '433 After the mediation and the
execution of the terms sheets, the parties began exchanging settlement
documentation, but were unsuccessful in reaching a consensus on the fi-
nal settlement documents. Thereafter, one of the parties filed a motion
to enforce the term sheets. Without conducting a trial, the trial court
heard testimony regarding the term sheets and held that they constituted
binding and enforceable settlement agreements.
424. 898 S.W.2d at 262.
425. 908 S.W.2d 517 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1995, orig. proceeding).
426. Id. at 518.
427. Id.
428. 893 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1995, orig. proceeding).
429. Id. at 292.
430. Id. at 294.
431. 909 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no writ).




Observing that mediated settlement agreements are to be treated no
differently than other contracts, the court of appeals decided that a fact
issue existed regarding the parties' intent, namely, whether the parties
intended for formal settlement documentation to be a condition prece-
dent to a final settlement agreement, or merely a memorial of an already
enforceable settlement agreement reflected in the term sheets. 434 Ac-
cordingly, the court held that a jury trial should have been held regarding
the settlement as a timely jury demand had been made.435 In reaching
that result, the court observed that there is nothing in the statutory
scheme for alternative dispute resolution which authorizes courts to fol-
low special procedures for the enforcement of mediated settlement
agreements. 436
Similarly, in Cary v. Gary,437 the parties reached a written settlement
after a protracted mediation. Four days later, one party filed a notice of
"possible repudiation" of settlement agreement. Nonetheless, the trial
court entered a consent judgment based on the settlement. The court of
appeals found this action to be in error, noting that a consent judgment
cannot be rendered unless consent exists at the time of judgment.438 The
court found nothing in the alternative dispute resolution statute which
would confer heightened dignity to an agreement reached through media-
tion.439 The court did recognize, however, that the aggrieved party could
still assert a claim at trial for breach of the settlement agreement."40
Although not involving mediation, the supreme court in S & A Restau-
rant Corp. v. Leal,441 addressed a similar issue. In this personal injury
suit involving a plaintiff who was wheelchair bound, the parties an-
nounced a settlement in open court, which was approved by the trial
judge. Before judgment was entered, plaintiff had a miraculous recovery
and was observed walking by the defendant. Accordingly, the defendant
sought to withdraw its consent to the settlement, but the trial court en-
tered judgment anyway. In setting aside the judgment, the supreme court
observed that a party may revoke its consent to a settlement at any time
before a "judgment is rendered." 442 The court held that the plaintiff
would still have a claim for breach of the settlement agreement, subject to
defendant's defense of fraudulent inducement. 443
434. Id. at 196-97 (citing Foreca, S.A. v. GRD Dev. Co., 758 S.W.2d 744, 746 (Tex.
1988)).
435. Id. at 197.
436. Id. at 195.
437. 894 S.W.2d 111 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ).
438. Id. at 112.
439. Id. at 112-13.
440. Id. at 113.
441. 892 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1995).
442. Id. at 857.




Rule 11 provides, in general, that no agreement touching any pending
suit may be enforced "unless it be in writing, signed and filed with the
papers as part of the record, or unless it be made in open court and en-
tered of record." 444 Although the rule has been in existence for over 100
years, the supreme court, in Padilla v. LaFrance,445 had occasion for the
first time to consider the significance of the filing requirement. In this
case, the parties had exchanged a series of letters which reflected an
agreement on settlement. The letters, however, had not been filed with
the court before one of the parties attempted to revoke his consent to the
settlement. Although recognizing that Rule 11 requires a writing to be
filed in the court record, the supreme court noted that the rule does not
say when the writing must be filed."46 Recognizing the policy in Texas
jurisprudence which favors settlement of lawsuits, the court held that the
agreement was still enforceable even if the papers were filed after one of
the parties withdrew their consent to the settlement. 447
The court in Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Perez,"48 faced an issue
that commonly arises. In this case, plaintiff's counsel sent a letter to de-
fendant's counsel confirming an agreement whereby the defendant pur-
portedly agreed to provide certain information in response to discovery
requests. The court held that since the letter was not signed by defendant
or his counsel, it was not enforceable under Rule 11.449
F. TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDERS
In Ex parte Lesikar,450 the supreme court held that an oral extension of
a temporary restraining order is ineffective. 451 Accordingly, the court
held that a party may not be held in contempt for violation of a tempo-
rary restraining order unless it is committed to writing and the party has
notice of the actual written extension.452
444. TEx. R. Civ. P. 11 (emphasis added).
445. 907 S.W.2d 454 (Tex. 1995).
446. Id. at 461.
447. Id.
448. 904 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1995, no writ).
449. Id. at 822.
450. 899 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. 1995).
451. Id.
452. Id; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 680.
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